Board of Managers\u27 Authority to Borrow Money by Casey, James L.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 48 
Number 4 Volume 48, May 1974, Number 4 Article 24 
August 2012 
Board of Managers' Authority to Borrow Money 
James L. Casey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Casey, James L. (1974) "Board of Managers' Authority to Borrow Money," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 48 : 
No. 4 , Article 24. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol48/iss4/24 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
BOARD OF MANAGERS' AUTHORITY
TO BORROW MONEY
Unforeseen events affecting common elements can expose con-
dominium unit owners to significant financial burdens with little
notice.' Borrowing by the board of managers of the condominium
association2 is one method by which unplanned expenses can be borne
without subjecting unit owners to the financial hardship posed by
sudden special assessments made by the association. Moreover, borrow-
ing represents a potential means of financing alterations and capital
improvements to the common elements. Borrowing may offer an at-
tractive means of financing common expenses. The threshold question
is: does the board of managers possess the authority to borrow without
approval of the condominium unit owners?
The need for a board of managers to consider borrowing would
most likely apply to circumstances where comparatively large sums
of money must be generated within a short span of time. The more
urgent the circumstances creating the unanticipated common expenses,
the more appealing borrowing becomes. The necessity for prompt re-
sponse to a sudden expense suggests the need for board power to bypass
unit owners when considering the unplanned outlay. Defects in heat-
1 Either by statutory command or inclusion in project documents, the owners' asso-
ciation bears the responsibility for administering and maintaining the common elements
of the condominium and may assess unit owners to meet expenses. 4A R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 633.24, at 857-59 (rev. ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as POWELL].
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-56A (Supp. 1973) ("The council of co-owners shall be re-
quired to make provisions for maintenance of common elements .... '); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1355(b) (West Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-14 (Supp. 1973).
Where responsibility for maintenance of the common elements is not set forth
explicitly, the association's role can be inferred from the statutory requirements that the
management group keep accurate administrative records and that the bylaws provide for
the maintenance, management and repair of the common elements. For examples of this
latter form of legislation, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-80(b)(6) (Supp. 1973); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 514-19, 20 (1968); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-v (McKinney 1968); P.R.
LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 1293a (1967).
2 Setting the level of expenditures for the common elements is a task usually per-
formed by the board of managers of the association. This duty is delegated to the board
in condominium bylaws containing language similar to the following: "The Board of
Managers shall from time to time, and at least annually, prepare a budget for the Con-
dominium .... " Bylaws, St. Tropez Condominium (New York, N.Y. Jan. 14, 1965),
reprinted in P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, IA CONDOMINIUM LAW & PRACricE app. 99 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as ROHAN & RFSKIN]. See also id. at app. 149, 375.
The recurring nature of many expenses, coupled with their ascertainable costs, pro-
duces a high degree of certainty in the budgeting process. Assessments against indi-
vidual units are normally determined on an annual basis. Payment by the unit owner
is typically required to be made monthly or semi-annually. Thus, the contribution of the
individual unit toward the common expenses is set in advance with some precision. See
generally I ROHAN & RESKIN § 6.04(1), at 6-24.
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ing,3 air conditioning, electrical, water and sanitary sewage systems may
necessitate borrowing, as repairs to these elements by their nature are
costly and must be made immediately. However, expenditures for
recurring common costs, such as routine maintenance, should be
provided for in the condominium budget. Similarly, the existence of a
condominium reserve fund4 containing resources sufficient to cover
unpredicted expenses or the availability of insurance indemnification5
would eliminate or reduce the necessity of borrowing.
Should the board of managers attempt to defray the cost of un-
foreseen repairs to common elements by immediate increase in assess-
ments, two considerations become important. Although condominium
bylaws frequently contain some form of special assessment proce-
dur6 whereby new assessments are either set by the board of managers
or approved by a majority of the association, the process is time con-
suming. In the case of a special assessment by the board of managers,
bylaws often stipulate that thirty days notice must be provided
before it can be levied. Where the assessment is to be made pursuant to
the vote of the unit owners' association, both an initial delay in con-
ducting the vote, and a further delay of ten to thirty days before the
special assessment is payable, are inevitable.6 A special assessment is
3 It is possible to obtain insurance on a building's boiler. Procuring such insurance
is more judicious than relying upon the condominium to self-finance or borrow in order
to repair a damaged heating plant. For a discussion of insurance in the context of the
condominium see note 5 infra.
4 See text accompanying notes 25-26 infra for a discussion of reserve funds.
G Ordinarily the owners' association will obtain a master policy to insure against
casualty loss. Unit owners are generally free to procure casualty insurance for their own units
despite the existence of a master policy. See 1 ROHAN & RFSKIN § 11.03(l), at 11-14. Given
the general availability of master policy coverage, and the ability to factor the cost of
the policy premium into unit assessments, the need for post-casualty, borrowing would
only occur in the event the master policy was inadequate. Foresight, as manifested by a
close examination of the policy, as well as periodic review of the level of coverage, would
prevent the existence or development of gaps in a policy which could cause a post-
casualty shortfall in coverage. See generally 1 ROHAN & RESKIN § 11.02(2), at 11-7; Ellman,
Fundamentals of Condominiums and Some Insurance Problems, 1963 INs. L.J. 733 (1963);
Rohan, Drafting Condominium Instruments: Provisions for Destruction, Obsolescence and
Eminent Domain, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 593 (1965); Rohan, Disruption of the Condominium
Venture: The Problems of Casualty Loss and Insurance, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 1045 (1965).
The Illinois condominium act directs the board of managers to obtain insurance for
the "full insurable replacement cost of the common elements and the units." ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 30, § 312 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973). Missouri has similar legislation. See Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 448.120 (Vernon Supp. 1974). For a general discussion of insurance and the con-
dominium see Note, Condominium Casualty and Liability Insurance, supra.
6 Invocation of special assessment power, by either method, may be conditioned
in the bylaws by a prerequisite that existing regular assessments be insufficient to provide
the resources to pay for the unplanned common expense, though the bylaws need contain no
such condition. It is therefore conceivable that extraordinary assessments could be voted
at any time by the owners' association or the board of managers. See 4A PoWELL
633.36, at 923. In practice, it appears that the association is the body empowered to levy
special assessments.
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likely to work a special hardship upon the less financially secure unit
owners; conceivably, some would be unable to meet the new assess-
ment.
7
Borrowing in order to meet sudden common expenses would
allow the board of managers to obtain funds without the delay associ-
ated with a special assessment. Nor would unit owners find them-
selves required to respond to an assessment on comparatively short
notice. Having secured the necessary financing through a loan, the
condominium board of managers could be flexible in establishing an
assessment payment schedule since the object would be to retire a
loan rather than raise a fixed sum in a short period of time.
The question remains as to whether the board of managers, even
in limited circumstances, has the authority to borrow money without
the explicit consent of at least a majority of the unit owners' association.
This issue has neither been addressed by case law nor by condominium
literature.7 a An examination of the two methods of managing the con-
dominium, the association and the corporation, offers a framework
within which the question of the board's authority can be analyzed.
THE ASSOCIATION
The association's concern for common expenses stems from its re-
sponsibility to maintain the common elements. 8 This duty is delegated
inasmuch as the association has no property interest in the common
elements.9 As a consequence, the association and its board of managers
function in the capacity of agents of the individual unit owners. This
principal-agent relationship presents a major impediment to any effort
by the board of managers to secure a loan.
At the outset, a board of managers attempting to borrow without
unit owner approval is confronted with the common law doctrine that
the general power of an agent to act on behalf of his principal does
7 Delinquency among unit owners, especially on a large scale, would severely handi-
cap efforts to meet the burden of extraordinary common expenses. Under condominium
enabling legislation, a delinquent unit can be subjected to a lien for nonpayment of the
common charges. Acting on behalf of the unit owners, the board of managers may bring
an action to foreclose such a lien. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 339-z, -aa (McKinney
1968). Like tle special assessment, the lien foreclosure procedure is time consuming.
7a For a discussion of board's authority to borrow money in New York, see Condo-
minium Workshop, supra at pp. 684-85.
8 See note I supra.
9 Even in the absence of statutory delegation to the association or board of re-
sponsibility for maintaining common elements, such a duty may be readily assigned in the
bylaws; under common law the management of a cotenancy may be delegated. See 4A
POWELL 633.24, at 858-59; 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 6.18, at 77 (A. Casner ed.
1952); Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50 CALIF.
L. REv. 299, 308 n.1 (1962).
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not confer upon the former authority to borrow money.10 Occasionally
courts will find that implied authority to borrow exists, but only where
such a power is necessarily inferred from the scope and nature of the
authority delegated to the agent." Condominium project documents
do not, as a general practice, contain explicit authority for the associa-
tion or board to borrow in order to meet common expenses. Lacking
such authority in the declaration or bylaws, were a board of managers
to seek a loan without unit owner approval it would be functioning
without the express consent of its principals, thus exceeding the bounds
of the board's common law defined authority. Nor can it be success-
fully maintained that implied authority exists for such a practice.
Assessment of the unit owners is the method typically outlined in
bylaws to finance common expenses. 12 Unplanned needs are to be met,
according to common bylaw provisions, through special assessments. 13
In light of the detail usually devoted to financing in bylaws, it would
be difficult to sustain the argument that in discharging the task of
maintaining the common areas the board of managers enjoys implied
borrowing authority. 14 The very presence of specific revenue raising
procedures in the condominium statutes and project bylaws would
10 This proposition and its rationale were set forth in Williams v. Dugan, 217 Mass.
526, 105 N.E. 615 (1914), where the court observed: "The power to borrow money or to
execute and deliver promissory notes is one of the most important which a principal can
confer upon an agent. It is fraught with great possibilities of financial calamity. It is
not lightly to be implied." Id. at -, 105 N.E. at 615. See Levin v. Commissioner, 355
F.2d 987, 990 (5th Cir. 1966); Lamb v. General Associates, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d 623, 374 P.2d
677 (1962); Bank of America v. Horowytz, 104 N.J. Super. 35, 248 A.2d 446 (Bergen
County Ct. 1968).
11 See Williams v. Dugan, 217 Mass. 526, 105 N.E. 615 (1914) (the agent's authority to
borrow "either must be granted by express terms or flow as a necessary and inevitable
consequence from the nature of the agency actually created.") Similarly, the Restatement
focuses upon the authority expressly conferred by a principal in evaluating the question
of his agent's implied borrowing power: "Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is not
authorized to borrow unless such borrowing is usually incident to the performance of acts
which he is authorized to perform for the principal." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
74 (1957).
12 See note 2 supra.
13 See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
14 Beyond the problem posed by agency case law, the common law distinction be-
tween commercial and non-profit associations could complicate any effort to borrow. As
enunciated in McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N.Y. 89, 30 N.E. 728 (1892), members of non-
profit associations are not personally bound by debts incurred by the organization's
officers or executive committee members, unless the expenditures are necessary to main-
tain the organization. See Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 683 (1951). In the
case of an association organized for profit, the members are said to be partners. There is
authority to the effect that members of a condominium association are subject to a
partnership-type liability, unless the association has exceeded its authority. See Berger,
Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 987, 1007 n.112
(1963). It should be observed that Professor Berger views this partnership form of
liability as unwarranted in light of the non-profit aspects of the association. Id.
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seem to preclude the contention that borrowing is a permissible
manner in which to pay for common expenses.
THE INCORPORATION ALTERNATIVE
Incorporation seemingly presents the board of managers with a
significant opportunity to avoid the case law disabilities facing a board
functioning within the framework of an owners' association. However
it is achieved, 4 a incorporation produces a separate legal entity; the
agency-derived restraints upon association and board behavior are
avoided by the corporation. As director of the affairs of the corpora-
tion, the board of managers enjoys considerable latitude in the power
it may exercise to benefit the corporation.15 In light of the diminished
impact of the ultra vires doctrine and the existence of liberal incor-
poration legislation, this view of broad board power appears all the
more plausible. Accordingly, simply by virtue of incorporation the
condominium board of managers would be in a position to contend that
it impliedly possesses authority to obtain loans as a reasonable and cus-
tomary corporate power, as well as a means to accomplish its duty to
care for the common elements. 16
14a For a discussion of some of the problems which must be dealt with if the in-
corporation method is to be utilized, see Condominium Workshop, supra at p. 730.
15 The general view of the broad power of the board of directors of a corporation
was expressed in Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918):
All powers directly conferred by statute, or impliedly granted, of necessity, must
be exercised by the directors who are constituted by the law as the agency for
the doing of corporate acts. In the management of the affairs of the corporation,
they are dependent solely upon their own knowledge of its business and their own
judgment as to what its interests require. . . They hold such office charged with
the duty to act for the corporation according to their best judgment, and in so
doing they cannot be controlled in the reasonable exercise and performance of
such duty.
Id. at 322-23, 119 N.E. at 562. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717 (McKinney 1968).
16 Suggestions for the incorporation of the condominium have been prompted in
large measure because of the liability of unit owners for the negligent construction or
operation of the common elements. See Knight, Incorporation of Condominium Common
Areas? An Alternative, 50 N.C.L. REv. 1, 8 (1971); Note, Condominiums: Incorporation of
the Common Elements-A Proposal, 23 VAND. L. REv. 321, 329 (1970). See generally 4A
POWELL 633.36.
One recent proposal for incorporation involves placing both the operation and
ownership of the common elements in a corporation. Each unit owner would own shares
in the corporation in proportion to what, absent the existence of the corporation, would
be the unit's undivided interest in the common elements. The unit owner would have
the same privilege of enjoyment of the common areas as his counterpart in an unin-
corporated condominium. The project documents would stipulate that the corporation
stock could only be conveyed when it was accompanied by title to a unit. See Note,
Condominiums: Incorporation of the Common Elements- A Proposal, 23 V.ND. L. REv.
321, 329 (1970).
The potential for collateral afforded by placing ownership of the common elements
in the management corporation is clearly a positive feature of this proposal. With title
to the common elements in the corporation, the board would be in a more advantageous
1126
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While incorporation apparently provides the board of managers
with independent authority to borrow, the peculiar statutory environ-
ment of condominium financing is hostile to such an interpretation.
Enabling legislation provides, either expressly or by necessary implica-
tion, for the raising of revenue by the association-for the operation
of the common elements. The association, and its board of managers,
may be specifically empowered to finance the common expenses in
one of two fashions. The unit owner may be directed by statute to
pay his proportionate share of the common expenses, 17 or the associa-
tion may be required by law to include in its bylaws the procedure for
determining and collecting assessments for the common expenses.'
Whichever approach is selected, it is clear that legislatures intend the
financing of common expenses to be by way of unit owner assessments.
Had legislatures contemplated financing common expenses through
lending institutions, they would have so provided in their condo-
minium enabling legislation. A fortiori, where legislation establishes
the process for collection to meet common expenses, the absence of
specific authorization to borrow is a strong indication that the law-
makers did not view the board of managers as possessing the power to
borrow.10
position to secure a loan by mortgaging the common areas. For a discussion of the
problem of offering security for a loan see text accompanying note 20 infra. Otherwise
this plan is unworkable because it fails to deal effectively with the nonpartition pro-
visions of condominium acts. For example, the Pennsylvania condominium law stipulates
that:
The undivided interest in the common elements may not be separated from the
unit to which such interest pertains and shall be deemed to be conveyed, leased
or encumbered with the unit even though such interest is not expressly referred
to or described in the deed, lease, mortgage or other instrument. The common
elements shall remain undivided ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 700.202 (1965). See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 47, § 289 (Cum. Supp.
1971); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-560 (Supp. 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 47-74 (1973);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.05 (1969).
A second, less complex proposal, is based upon the formation of a corporation to
manage the common elements. The condominium common areas would be leased to the
corporation. At the same time, every unit owner would be issued shares of stock in the
corporation on the basis of the unit's undivided interest in the common elements. Lease
payments would be made to unit owners by the corporation. In turn, the corporation
would charge unit owners for the maintenance services it provided for the common
areas. See Knight, Incorporation of the Common Areas? An Alternative, 50 N.C.L. REv.
I, 11 (1971). Mr. Knight contends that the proposal will provide a ready vehicle for
financing improvements to the common elements. Id. Inasmuch as the management
corporation could not mortgage the common elements, this claim seems dubious.
17 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 448.080 (Vernon Supp. 1974).
18 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 47, § 304 (Cum. Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §
47-80 (1973); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.08 (Baldwin 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §
700.303 (Purdon 1965).
19 A number of jurisdictions have non-profit incorporation statutes. A corporation
designed to manage the affairs of the common elements could organize under such legis-
lation, as well as under general incorporation laws. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 9200
1974] 1127
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On a more practical plane, the board of managers faces equally
serious problems. Realistically, the board is likely to find financial
institutions it has dealt with on a continuing basis fairly receptive to
loan requests involving modest amounts.20 The complexion of matters
changes dramatically, however, where the board attempts to obtain
a substantial loan. Such a loan would most frequently be used for
improvement or renovation of the common elements and not merely
for sudden repairs. In such a situation the board would find itself
severely handicapped as a result of its inability to offer adequate
security for a major loan, since it could not mortgage the common
elements.
Although Alabama and New Jersey have condominium blanket
mortgage statutes,2' enabling legislation in other jurisdictions pro-
scribes the imposition of a lien upon condominium property without
the consent of the unit owners. Typical of such laws is the New York
prohibition of liens against common areas:
Subsequent to recording the declaration and while the property
remains subject to this article, no lien of any nature shall there-
after arise or be created against the common elements except with
the unanimous consent of the unit owners. During such period,
(West 1955); IowA CODE ANN. § 504A.4 (Supp. 1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.117
(1973). Contained within the Illinois condominium act is specific authorization to incor-
porate under that state's not-for-profit corporation statute. See ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 30, §
318.1 (Smith-Hurd 1969).
Nonprofit incorporation statutes may introduce a new dimension to the question of
the power of a board of managers to borrow without unit owner permission. For ex-
ample, the California nonprofit corporation law specifically grants a nonprofit corporation
authority to borrow money. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 9501 (West 1955). It must be noted,
however, that legislation regarding nonprofit corporations was enacted without con-
sidering its impact upon condominium laws. In fact, many nonprofit incorporation laws
were enacted prior to the passage of condominium legislation.
Until recently New York condominiums could only organize as associations. How-
ever, an amendment to N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-v(l)(a) (McKinney 1968), provides
that nothing contained in the New York condominium law
shall bar the incorporation of the board of managers under applicable statutes
of this state; such incorporation must be consistent with the other provisions of
this article and the nature of the condominium purpose.
N.Y. SEss. LAWS [1974], ch. 1056, § 6 (McKinney). It should be observed that this legis-
lation does not specify the method by which the board of managers may incorporate.
Presumably, therefore, incorporation could be accomplished pursuant to N.Y. NoT-FOR-
PROFIT CORP. LAw § 401 et seq. (McKinney 1970), as well as under New York's general
incorporation legislation, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 401 et seq. (McKinney 1963).
20 Current practice seems to support this view. In the event a condominium needs
a small loan, a representative.of the board or association will contact the institution where
the assessments are deposited following collection. Apparently a loan will be forth-
coming if the condominium can provide assurances that its counsel finds no objection
to this practice.
21 The Alabama blanket condominium mortgage statute is part of chapter 1059 of
the Alabama Laws of 1973, reprinted in part in CONDOMINIUM REP., Jan., 1974, at 5;
N.J. REv. STAT. § 46:88-23 (1969).
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liens may arise or be created only against the several units and
their respective common interests.22
The unanimous approval requirement of such legislation 23 in effect
operates to defeat the securing of a sizeable loan by the use of a unitary
mortgage. Furthermore, this virtual prohibition also denies the board
of managers the option of raising capital for major improvements by
refinancing an existing mortgage. 24
RESERVE FUNDS
The most appropriate response to the need to generate large sums
to meet common element expenses is to adequately anticipate sub-
stantial capital expenditures. For example, obsolescence predictably
will occur in portions of the common elements.2 5 As a result, modifica-
tions or renovation will eventually be necessary. Through proper
planning a construction fund can be established. Thereafter, regular
assessments can reflect the funding level required to accomplish planned
renovations or improvements.2 6 In view of the reserve fund alternative,
there is no need to enact legislation permitting the imposition of
mortgages upon the condominium property solely as a consequence of
a determination by the board of managers that major financing is
needed. A decision to impose a blanket mortgage, with its inevitable
diminishing of unit owner independence, more appropriately should
include unit owner participation. Accordingly, any statutory change
in this area must reasonably include a requirement that, as a condition
precedent to obtaining a loan and unitary mortgage, a board of man-
agers secure the consent of a substantial majority of the unit owners.
Borrowing of modest sums for unbudgeted common expenses not
covered by a reserve fund could be facilitated by providing for a trust
22 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 339-1 (McKinney 1968). See generally Wisner, Financing
the Condominium in New York: The Conventional Mortgage, 31 ALBANY L. REv. 32, 42
(1967); 8 VILL. L. REv. 538, 548 (1963).
23 Assuming the unanimous approval required under the New York law, the lien
will be inferior to existing mortgages on the condominium units.
24 In the absence of authority to incur a blanket mortgage on condominium property,
second mortgages on the individual units could offer a partial solution to the problem of
providing security to a lender. A second mortgage generates its own problems. Quite pos-
sibly the institutional lender would not accept such an arrangement. Furthermore, indi-
vidual unit owners might look askance at an encumbrance added to their existing unit
mortgages.
25 For a discussion of the problems of obsolescence in condominiums, see Rohan,
Drafting Condominium Instruments: Provisions for Destruction, Obsolescence and Eminent
Domain, 65 CoLUmn. L. Rav. 593, 603-13 (1965).
26 This method of self-financing may have limited applicability if the bylaws restrict
the amount allocated to the reserve funds using a formula based upon the allocation of
the previous year. For example, some bylaws limit the reserve fund level to 105% of the
previous allocation.
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fund to assure repayment to a lender, rather than attempting to use the
traditional mortgage as the vehicle for securing a loan. Under this
scheme, a short term loan could be obtained by the board of man-
agers without unit owner approval. By statute, the assessments of the
unit owners would be placed in a trust fund to be used for the benefit
of the lender should repayment not be forthcoming within the time
provided in the loan instrument.
MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS
Lending institutions in various states have been requiring counsel
for the condominium board of managers to issue an opinion letter to
the effect that the condominium's board does have authority to borrow
money. In addition to the legal difficulties already mentioned, most
condominium bylaws set a dollar limit on contracts that the board of
managers can enter into without the approval of a majority (and in
some cases, two-thirds) of the unit owners. Query whether a borrowing
in excess of that specified dollar figure would be tantamount to doing
indirectly what one cannot do directly. A loan taken out by the board
of managers could also lead to marketable title problems, or constitute
a trap for the unwary purchaser on resale of a unit, after the loan was
in effect. The condominium statutes invariably stipulate that the in-
coming unit owner is released from all personal liability for past
charges once the board of managers notifies the prospective purchaser
on resale that all charges against the unit in question are paid-up
through the date set for closing of title. Suppose the board were to
mention in the letter that the unit owner (present and/or future) is
also responsible indirectly for repayment of all or a specified fraction
of the outstanding loan balance. Even if the board of managers issued
a clean letter with respect to unpaid common charges, the board acted
as agent for the unit owners with respect to the loan. Could the board
absolve the outgoing unit owner of liability to the lender without the
consent of the lender? Also, if the board did not mention the loan in
its letter concerning paid-up common charges, would not the unit
purchaser on resale be placed in jeopardy (as well as the mortgagee
financing his purchase) since there would be no recorded loan docu-
ment to alert the purchaser as to what he was getting into?
CONCLUSION
The authority of the board of managers to borrow to meet com-
mon expenses has not received the attention of legislatures or draftsmen
of condominium documents. Predictably, however, condominiums
1130 [Vol. 48:1122
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will be faced with circumstances suggesting the need for substantial
loans, either because of unplanned operating costs, large scale improve-
ments or renovation in response to obsolescence. Given these needs,
it would be most appropriate if legislation were drafted which in-
creased the funding flexibility of the board of managers by authorizing
the acquiring of loans without unduly sacrificing the independence of
individual unit owners. At a minimum, it would appear essential that
the documentation of each condominium project be required to state
whether the board of managers is authorized to borrow money, and,
if so, under what terms and conditions. Where funds are actually
borrowed, the statute should clarify the personal liability of constituent
unit owners and their ability to be relieved of such liability on resale.
Further, the board of managers should be required to inform a pur-
chaser on resale of all outstanding loans and how they affect his personal
liability and his unit in the event of nonpayment. Finally, the statutes
should clarify the question whether the existence of such a loan con-
stitutes an objection to title on resale where the contract between
buyer and seller makes no specific mention of the matter.
James L. Casey
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